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  iiREGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS FOR AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
In a developing country, government policy plays an important role when agricultural 
biotechnology is introduced from abroad, such as when importing a genetically modified 
(GM) crop variety that has the potential to improve upon traditional varieties.  The “host” 
government in a developing country may enable imports of a new GM variety and may 
allocate resources to the enforcement of the intellectual property rights (IPRs) that a 
foreign firm holds.  In some cases, the host government may also choose to regulate the 
uses of the new technology, such as when adoption of the technology conveys positive or 
negative effects or externalties on the developing country’s economy. 
It is well established in the literature that numerous choices or tradeoffs may 
attend the government’s decisions with respect to GM variety (Dutfield, Gaisford et al., 
Perrin).  For example, a new variety may introduce both positive and negative 
externalities in addition to the productivity gains to be experienced by domestic 
producers.  That is, there may be concern about public acceptance of the GM variety or 
concern about biosafety, human health effects or environmental threats to biodiversity.  
Conversely, there may be concern about the adequacy of financial incentives for foreign 
innovators to license their technology to the host country or for them to address that 
country’s specific research needs.  Commercial terms to license the technology may 
result in the repatriation of substantial royalties (monopoly rents) to innovators abroad.  
Consequently, host governments are positioned to play a strategic role in enforcing 
  1intellectual property rights (IPRs) and in controlling any externalities associated with the 
use of a new technology.   
There is a growing literature that examines the welfare effects of alternative IPR 
regimes.  Deardorff explores the issue of extending patent protection from the net-
technology producing North to the net-technology consuming South and shows that 
effective IPR enforcement has a negative effect on the welfare of the South.  Vishwasrao 
incorporates asymmetric information in a partial equilibrium, game theoretic setting to 
examine similar issues.  Zigic, on the other hand, shows that in an applied duopoly model 
with technological spillovers, the South might not gain in terms of social welfare by 
relaxing IPRs.  In a recent paper, Perrin argues that enforcement of IPRs in the Southern 
countries may be an answer to bridge the productivity gap between the North and the 
South. 
This article builds upon recent game-theoretic analyses that model IPRs enforced 
by the host country when a foreign-owned monopolist introduces a new GM variety.  
Giannakas shows how a host government can, within limits, balance the competing 
interests of foreign rights holders and domestic crop producers by explicitly choosing to 
enforce the IPRs imperfectly.  Strategic behavior by government allows the host country 
to capture some of the advantages of a new GM variety, and to experience lower GM 
seed prices than if IPRs were fully enforced.  A more recent article (Chattopadhyay and 
Horbulyk) extends the analysis to include a new GM crop variety that also brings 
disadvantages to the adopting country.  Since this GM variety brings some (perceived or 
  2actual) disadvantage, government's optimal policy response is also altered to include a 
corrective per unit tax on seed of the GM variety. 
The current article models the strategic, sequential interaction of the host 
government, the foreign IPR holder, and domestic producers.  The agents’ interactions 
are modeled as a non-cooperative game in a small open economy. The principal 
development in this article is to expand the host country’s public policy response to 
include either a form of corrective subsidy or a tax, and then to compare policy 
alternatives explicitly.  Specifically, within a given IPR enforcement regime, government 
now introduces either an optimal per unit corrective subsidy on the traditional crop 
variety or it imposes an optimal per unit tax on the GM seed.  The relative effectiveness 
of the two policy instruments is influenced by some producers’ ability to infringe upon 
the IPRs on the GM variety without detection. 
Closed-form analytical results describe the government’s choice of the optimal 
tax or subsidy rates, where government strategically considers the behavior of both the 
foreign monopolist and the domestic producers if subject to the optimal tax or subsidy.  
In a static model with full information, the monopolist is expected to respond by 
adjusting market prices for GM seed, and (heterogeneous) domestic producers are 
expected to respond by choosing to cultivate larger amounts of either traditional varieties 
or the unlicensed GM variety.  A series of cases is used to derive the optimal tax and 
subsidy rates and to compare the levels and distribution of social welfare under regimes 
with perfect versus imperfect enforcement of IPRs on the GM variety.   
  3As anticipated, either the optimal tax or the optimal subsidy can raise host country 
welfare, yet, due to the presence of a foreign-owned monopoly, the “first best” outcome 
cannot be achieved by a single corrective tax or subsidy.  If perfect enforcement of IPRs 
were possible, then either a tax on one variety or a subsidy on the other would lead to the 
“second best” outcome.  However, under imperfect enforcement of IPRs, the use of an 
optimal tax is more effective at raising social welfare than is the optimal subsidy.    
As the survey by Perrin shows, considerable attention is being paid to 
government’s role in the debates about IPRs, GM organisms and trade related IPRs 
(TRIPs).  Whereas much of the earlier debate cast these choices as “all or nothing,” the 
current article identifies various margins of adjustment for public policy and compares 
relatively simple policy instruments in a complex strategic environment.  The results of 
this article’s analysis support the implementation of public policy in a strategic manner 
that incorporates the optimizing behavior of all other agents.  
The next section sets out the framework and key assumptions of the theoretical 
model recently presented by Giannakas.  This model is then used to characterize behavior 
in each of six distinct cases.  Whereas the first of these cases is essentially the same 
problem analyzed by Giannakas with specific modifications noted, the other cases build 
from that framework to address new issues.  The analytical results are then compared and 
illustrated numerically, followed by conclusions.   
  4Theoretical Model 
Consider a developing country characterized by a small open economy in which three 
types of economic agents interact in the production of an agricultural crop for domestic 
and export use.  Each type of agent will be described briefly. 
Crop producers (producers, hereafter) form a heterogeneous group; differentiated 
by some productivity attribute such as farm location, soil characteristics or climate.   
Producers are risk-neutral and seek to maximize their expected short run profits by choice 
of a traditional or genetically modified crop variety best suited to their productivity 
attribute.  Producers are price takers on input and output markets. 
A foreign innovator (the monopolist, hereafter) holds the exclusive IPRs to import 
and to sell domestically the seeds for a GM variety of the crop.  This GM variety offers 
increases in productivity and profit for some producers according to their differentiating 
attribute.  The monopolist’s objective is to maximize profits for its foreign-based 
shareholders by optimal choice of seed price for this GM variety.  By assumption, the 
monopolist faces no costs to license, develop or adapt the GM variety to this market, and 
can replicate the GM seed for sale to producers at constant marginal cost. 
The “host” government in this developing country (government, hereafter) seeks 
to maximize the contribution to domestic social welfare that comes from production of 
this crop.  The principal contribution of crop production to social welfare comes in the 
form of producers’ surplus. However, social welfare, and thus government action, will 
also be influenced by any “production externalities” and by the operation of the 
government’s regulatory and enforcement activities with respect to IPRs, especially if 
  5these activities use resources or attract fiscal returns from abroad, for example.  The 
government is cognizant that the monopolist requires some threshold level of short-run 
profits (possibly zero) to continue to offer the GM variety for sale domestically.  
The form of the negative externality considered here is any social cost that 
increases in proportion to the quantity of the seeds of the GM variety that are purchased 
and planted.  This form of externality is sufficiently general to encompass crop-specific 
effects such as perceived risks to other agricultural production activities, environmental 
concerns such as about biosafety and potential loss of biodiversity, or concerns by 
domestic residents about the GM crop’s use that are not otherwise reflected in its price. 
A GM crop variety might or might not be vulnerable to IPR infringement (i.e., 
unlicensed use).  Two distinct regimes are considered and these affect government’s role.  
Under one regime, producers find ways to gain the benefits of the GM variety without 
purchasing seed from the monopolist, such as when producers save seeds from a prior 
crop in violation of the IPR.  For a crop variety vulnerable to infringement, government is 
able to restrict but not eliminate such infringement through implementing an enforcement 
program that expends public resources and earns public revenue from fines.  By 
assumption, the scope and effectiveness of the enforcement program is taken as given by 
government, and might be determined by such factors as the type of crop in question or 
the general state of public enforcement infrastructure in the country.
1  Under the other 
regime, costless and perfect enforcement of the IPR is possible; such as when the GM 
variety incorporates a so-called “terminator gene” which makes it not possible for 
producers to save viable seeds.  Notice that, in this small open economy where crops are 
  6tradable at fixed world prices, if government policy influences a producer’s choice of the 
traditional versus GM variety, this does not directly influence consumers or any measure 
of domestic consumers’ surplus.   
The economic environment in which these three agents interact is characterized 
by full information about all other agents’ objectives, choices and expected payoffs.   
Where governments enforce against producers who infringe the IPRs of the GM variety, 
the expected probability of a producer paying a given fine is known, ex ante, and thus 
there is a basis for all agents to predict accurately what fraction of producers will 
infringe.  Interactions among agents take place once, within a static model of economic 
behavior, and are characterized by distinct short run equilibria in the markets for 
traditional and GM varieties of a single crop. 
The strategic element of agents’ behavior is illustrated in Figure 1, where a 
sequence of decisions is envisioned, and where all previous moves are fully observed 
before the next move is chosen.  The agents’ interaction is shown as a non-cooperative 
game in extensive form, which can be analyzed by backward induction.  Since each 
agent’s action fully anticipates the optimal and fully informed responses of other agents’ 
whose actions follow, there is no role for non-credible threats.  The result is a sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium. 
According to the figure, in each case where a genetically modified crop is 
introduced to the developing country, a distinguishing and exogenous characteristic is 
whether or not its IPR can be fully and costlessly enforced.  By assumption, only the GM 
crop variety will be associated with a production externality that affects domestic social
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Figure 1. Game tree showing net returns to producers (П) when government  




a In case (a),  0 τ  = 
0 η = 0 under perfect enforcement  
b In case (d),   1 τ  =  1 η  = 0, under imperfect enforcement 
  8welfare.  If government has a public policy instrument to address the externality 
associated with the GM variety, then that instrument will be a per unit (or excise) tax on 
seeds of the GM variety, or a per unit subsidy on seeds of the traditional variety.  Each 
producer chooses one crop variety acknowledging any differences in relative prices for 
the (GM versus traditional) seeds and crop outputs, especially as influenced by the rate of 
any corrective tax or subsidy. 
Agents’ Optimizing Behavior Under Six Alternative Assumptions 
Agents’ behavior and the resulting levels of social welfare can be examined in each of six 
cases that are identifiable from Figure 1.  The first three cases relate to the left-hand side 
of the figure, where costless and full enforcement of the IPR is possible.  Case (a) 
describes the situation with no public policy toward the externalities associated with the 
GM variety.  Cases (b) and (c) describe the situations where the government chooses an 
optimal rate of corrective tax or subsidy, respectively.  The last three cases address the 
right-hand side of the figure, where enforcement of the IPR is costly yet results in some 
exogenously determined degree of infringement.  Case (d) describes the situation with no 
public policy (other than IPR enforcement) toward the externalities associated with the 
GM variety.  In case (e), the government chooses an optimal rate of corrective tax on 
some GM seeds, yet cannot impose this tax on those seeds acquired by producers who are 
circumventing the IPR.  In case (f), a subsidy is offered on purchases of traditional seeds.   
An important determinant of the behavior of heterogeneous producers will be 
each’s distinguishing production attribute, A.  As in Giannakas, assume that each 
producer has a unique value of A drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval 
  90<A<1.  For illustrative purposes, imagine A to be the degree of resistance of each 
producer’s crop to (partial) yield losses due to frost, drought, soil salinity or pests.  In the 
short run, that degree of resistance, A, is a fixed and observable artifact of each 
producer’s arable land base.  Imagine that, for a given crop, biotechnology has created a 
GM variety that can decrease this crop’s vulnerability, thereby increasing yield for a 
given value of A.  Ceteris paribus, producers with high A values will find crop production 
to be more profitable even without the GM variety, and producers with low A values will 
gain relatively more from adopting the GM variety. 
In the short run, a producer’s choice of crop variety will be governed by 
maximization of a short run profit function or net returns function.  Fixed costs, capital 
investments (including other investments in A especially), and entry or exit possibilities 
are not relevant in the short run.  Allowing that other crop choices require some 
specialized (human or physical) capital, in the short run producers are committed to 
producing this crop, if any, and will consider available varieties. 
Case (a): No infringement of IPRs, no corrective policy to address the externality 
In case (a), producers have a choice of producing the traditional or the licensed variety of 
this crop, since perfect enforcement of IPRs eliminates access to unlicensed (illegal) 
seeds of the GM variety.  Define  t ∏  to be the net returns earned by producers while 
producing a unit of traditional crop; , to be the farm price of the traditional crop (net of 
all production costs except for seed) and  , to be the price of traditional seed.  Thus, 




(1)  A p p
s
t t t γ + − = ∏ . 
  10The variable ∏  denotes the net returns to producers of the GM crop variety, 
where   is the farm price of GM output (net of all production costs except for seed) 
and   is the price of the GM seed.  Equation (2) gives the net returns for a unit of GM 










gm φ + − = ∏ . 
Producers’ resistance to production risks and yield losses, as reflected in the 
production attributes, A, affects the crop returns through the parameters 0 > > φ γ .  As in 
Giannakas, to ensure that producers face a meaningful choice of the two available crop 
varieties that results in some of each being chosen, the pricing and productivity 
characteristics of the two crops must be such that  




gm gm p p p p φ γ . 
This condition states that, in order for neither variety to dominate the entire seed market, 
the GM crop must be profitable for producers who are inherently most vulnerable to yield 
losses (low A values), but that the advantage of the GM crop must dissipate for those 
producers whose A values already reflect high resistance to yield losses. 
Figure 2 illustrates the two crops’ relative profitability as viewed by heteroge-neous 
producers.  Equations (1) and (2) are plotted with (A, Π ) coordinates as straight lines 
whose right-hand vertical intercepts are labeled  t ∏ and   respectively.  The restriction 
(3) ensures that the (left-hand) vertical intercepts and slopes are such as to cause an 




which is the critical or threshold value of A, below which producers find the GM seeds to  
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Figure 2.  Producers’ decisions and net returns under perfect 
enforcement of IPRs with and without a tax on GM seed, cases 




















































Figure 3.  Optimal price and quantity of GM seed under perfect enforcement 
of IPRs, and loss in monopolist’s rent due to taxation, cases (a) and (b)   
  12be more profitable in the short run.  The figure also shows that if GM seeds were to have 
a higher price,  , then net returns, 
s
gm p ~ h
gm ∏
~
, would be lower, and in equilibrium fewer 
producers (fraction  gm A
~
) would choose the GM variety.  This choice will be relevant to 
case (b) where a tax is introduced. 
It will be useful to describe the quantities of GM seed that are associated with the 
fractions of producers (such as Agm or  gm A
~
) that choose the GM seed variety.  Since the 
net returns (1) and (2) that define Agm are expressed per unit of crop production, and since 
all of the producers have been distributed uniformly along the segment [0, 1] (by 
assumption), appropriate definition of units of measure for seed will assure that the value 




The monopolist’s problem is to set a price for GM seeds that will maximize short 
run profits.  By assumption, the monopolist faces constant short run marginal costs, 
denoted m.  This problem can be formally stated as
3 






x m p ) ( max − = π
where, with Agm equal to  , one may solve for the equilibrium price and quantity of 
GM seed.  This solution can be used to derive the monopolist’s (linear) demand curve, 
given by:  .  For notational simplicity, the intercept will 
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The government does not take any policy action in case (a) and the level of 
domestic social welfare generated in case (a) from production of the two crop varieties is 
  13defined as the benchmark level.  This level of social surplus consists of the producer’s 
surplus earned less the cost of the negative externality which accompanies the GM 
variety and which is borne by domestic residents.  Since all producers are uniformly 
distributed along the horizontal axis of Figure 2, by assumption, the total of their surplus 
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Define the per period monetary value of the negative
4 effects or damages of GM 
seed use to be  where c is a constant (0
s PE
a gm cx D = 1 ≤ < c ).  Therefore, in this case (a), 
social welfare (Wa) is 
(6)  = 
PE
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Implicit here is the assumption of a strict utilitarian social welfare function where gains in 
this sector are separable from those in other sectors. 
For each of the six cases under study, the short run equilibria in the economy can 
be characterized by the government’s optimal tax or subsidy rate, if any, by the 
monopolist’s optimal price and quantity for GM seeds, and by the resulting fractions of 
producers choosing each crop variety.  One can then describe analytically the level and 
distribution of social welfare as evaluated at these optimal values.  Table A1 in the 
Appendix collects these results, and Table 1 (below) will provide a numerical illustration. 
  14Case (b): No infringement of IPRs, new corrective tax to address the externality 
To address the negative externality that accompanies the GM variety, the government 
proposes a corrective tax to be levied on a per unit basis on producers’ purchases of the 
GM seed.  Under specific assumptions that do not hold here, a fully corrective (Pigovian) 
tax that was levied at a rate to match an activity’s marginal external cost could offset the 
externality and return the market allocation to Pareto optimality.  In cases (a) and (b) the 
exercise of monopoly power by the monopolist, with or without a tax, will necessarily 
frustrate attempts by the government to reach a Pareto optimal outcome by use of a single 
tax instrument.  In cases (d) through (f), the inability to prevent infringement of the IPR 
makes the government’s task even more difficult.  Thus, in cases (b), (c), (e) and (f), the 
government’s search for an optimal rate of tax or subsidy can at best lead to a constrained 
or “second-best” outcome in these markets (see Kolstad, p.129). 
Suppose the government contemplates a tax at rate  0 τ .  This will raise the tax-
inclusive price of GM seed to 
s




gm p p  and where   is the 
monopolist’s price) and lower the profitability of using the GM seed to  
s
gm p ˆ
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Figure 2 shows that producers would respond to the higher GM seed price by choosing 
not to produce as much of the GM variety.  Strictly speaking, many producers’ crop 
choice could be unaffected by the higher (tax inclusive) price, though their net returns 
would fall, but those with values of A between Agm and  gm A
~
 would switch varieties in 
response to the tax.   
  15Following the approach of backward induction for case (b), the monopolist sees 
the market demand curve for GM seeds moving leftward for positive rates of tax, and 
lowers the market price accordingly.  Re-solving the monopolist’s profit maximization 
problem will cause the monopolist to lower the (optimized) price of the GM seed variety 
by one-half the rate of tax per unit, ( 2 / 0 τ ) and will therefore raise the tax-inclusive price 
faced by the producers by the same amount.  This behavior is illustrated in Figure 3.   
In case (a), optimizing producers had established a maximum (marginal) 
willingness to pay for the GM seeds, given their productivity attribute, A, and the relative 
prices of traditional seeds and output.  That willingness to pay is still valid on a tax-
inclusive basis and is shown by the curve  .  On a pre-tax basis, their maximum 
(marginal) willingness to pay for the GM seeds is lower by the amount of the tax.  With 
linear demand curves and constant marginal costs, m, the static incidence of the tax is 
shared equally between the buyers and the seller in this market.  Figure 3 also illustrates 
the fall in the monopolist’s (innovator’s) rent by the ‘L’ shaped hatched area shown in the 
figure.  The rectangular area (shaded gray) is the tax revenue earned by the domestic 
government in the process.   
s
gm D
In case (b), the government’s problem is to choose the optimal rate of corrective 
tax ( ) to maximize social welfare, W
*
0 τ b, which consists of producers’ surplus (PSb) less 
negative externalities arising from biotechnology ( ) plus the tax revenue (TR
PE
b D b).  To 
ensure that the monopolist continues to sell output in the short run, it is necessary to 
  16ensure that the monopolist’s profit (IR) is at or above some threshold level, possibly zero.  
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Case (c): No infringement of IPRs, new corrective subsidy to address the externality 
Another relatively simple policy instrument to address the negative production externality 
is a per unit corrective subsidy to be offered on purchases of the traditional seed variety.
5  
Since, by assumption, in the short run there is a limited number of producers choosing 
this crop, if more choose the (subsidized) traditional variety there will be less production 
of the GM variety and less of its external cost borne domestically. 
For a subsidy paid at rate  0 η  on traditional seeds that are supplied competitively 
in the domestic market, the price of traditional seed drops to  , and the 
producers’ net returns function for the traditional crop becomes 
) ( 0 η −
s
t p
(9)  A p p
s
t t t γ η + − − = ∏ ) (
0 . 
This decrease in the domestic price of traditional seed causes a decrease in demand for 
GM seed.  The monopolist would therefore choose a lower price and quantity than 
without the subsidy.  Diagrammatic analysis of the producers’ crop choice decision 
would proceed as described in Figure 2, with these exceptions.  The net returns function 
for the GM variety would shift upward parallel, since the price has fallen, but the net 
returns function for the traditional variety would shift upwards farther, due to the subsidy.  
The resulting equilibrium allocation to the GM variety would decrease. 
  17Government’s choice of an optimal corrective subsidy rate,  , would be based 
on maximization of a social welfare function (W
*
0 η
c) that consists of producers’ surplus 














+ + − = − − =
B m c




c c c   
Case (d): Infringement of IPRs, no corrective policy to address the externality 
In the absence of any technology such as a “terminator gene,” there is, by assumption, the 
opportunity for some producers to infringe the monopolist’s IPR on a given crop variety 
by acquiring the seeds without paying any price.  Treating these “free” GM seeds as a 
“variety,” then the producers face a third “variety” choice,  , and associated expected 





(11)  .  ρ δ φ ) (A A pgm
c
gm − + = Π
Here  ) (A δ  is the probability of the developing country government identifying 
“cheating” (infringement) on the part of some producers, with (0 ≤ δ  ≤1), and ρ  is the 
fixed (per unit) penalty imposed (with certainty) on those producers who are caught.  The 
value of δ  depends upon the probability that the producers will be audited ( 0 δ ) and the 
producer- specific characteristics, denoted by the differentiating attribute A.  For 
simplicity, similar to Giannakas, a linear function is assumed to relate δ ,  0 δ  and A, i.e., 
A 0 δ δ = .  In the present study, for analytical purposes,  0 δ  is assumed to be fixed.   
  18The monopolist chooses a lower optimal seed price, 
s
gm p , when the IPRs are not 
fully protected.  Analyzing a similar case with an endogenous probability of detection, 
Giannakas (p. 485) shows that risk-neutral producers in this environment would choose 
the illegal seed whenever the market price of the GM seed is greater than the expected 
penalty from cheating. 
The enforcement cost to government of reducing IPR infringement (EC hereafter) 
is assumed to be an increasing function of the (exogenous) detection rate  
(12)  .  0 , 0 0 > > + = β α β αδ EC
Expected public revenue from the penalty (Fd) can be thought of as a function of the 
producers’ probability of getting caught while cheating ( A 0 δ ) and the penalty (ρ ), 
(13)  .  ∫ =
c
gm A
d dA A F
0
0 ) (δ ρ
As in cases (a) and (b), the producers’ optimizing choices of crop variety will sort 
the producers into three groups according to increasing values of their productivity 
attribute, A.  Those producers with the lowest attribute values will find it most profitable 
to infringe and to risk enforcement penalties.  Those with higher values will acquire the 
GM seed legally, whereas those with the highest A values will produce the traditional 
variety.   
Here, in case (d), the government implements no active policy with respect to 
external effects of GM crops.  Government implements the passive, costly and imperfect 
enforcement program to protect the monopolist’s IPRs from infringement and collects for 
  19its own use the revenue from fines.  Note that the valuation of the negative externality in 
this case now incorporates both legal and illegal components of GM seed usage, such that 






d x x c D + =
This implies that the damage caused under the imperfect enforcement scenario is more 
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Case (e): Infringement of IPRs, new corrective tax to address the externality 
In this case, the government’s attempts to control a negative externality using a corrective 
tax are made more difficult (than in case (b)) by the government’s inability to charge or 
to collect a tax on those producers who would infringe the monopolist’s IPR.  Those 
producers who are caught under this regime of imperfect enforcement will pay a fine, but 
not the tax.  (Although some jurisdictions’ penalties for sales tax evasion require payment 
of the evaded tax, here there is no attempt to tax infringing producers on GM seed 
purchases they did not make.) 
In case (e), both the tax and imperfect enforcement act to reduce market demand.  
Denoting the monopolist’s price here as 
s




gm p p ( , where  1 τ  is the 
optimal per unit tax.  Thus, net returns for the legal GM variety become  




gm φ + − = ∏ . 
  20A diagrammatic analysis similar to Figure 2 would identify the three ranges of A 
values over which, increasing from zero, producers choose to infringe, choose the legal 
GM variety and choose the traditional variety.  When a corrective tax is introduced to this 
environment, the total amount of the GM variety is reduced, but that portion of it which is 
legally produced falls and that portion of it which is produced illegally without purchased 
seed (or taxes) grows.  As in case (b), government will choose the optimal rate of tax 
with full information about how the GM crop will be priced and (in this case) with 
knowledge about the extent to which infringement will incur.  The resulting level of 
social welfare is 
(17)  
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Case (f): Infringement of IPRs, new corrective subsidy to address the externality 
Government levies a subsidy  1 η  per unit of traditional seed purchased, so that the price of 
traditional seed drops from   to ( .  Denoting the producer’s net returns from the 
(subsidized) traditional crop as ∏
s
t p ) 1 η −
s
t p
t′ ′ , gives  
(18)  .  A p p
s
t t t γ η + − − = ∏′ ′ ) ( 1
As in case (c) there will be a decrease in the monopolist’s optimal price to  , so that 
the producers’ net returns from the production of the legal GM variety become 
s
gm p′ ′
(19)  .  A p p s
gm gm
h
gm φ + ′ ′ − = ∏′ ′
  21One effect of the subsidy is to reduce total GM crop production and to increase the 
production of traditional crop output.  
Social welfare (Wf) consists of producer surplus (PSf), minus enforcement costs 
(EC), minus external effects ( ), minus subsidy payment (Pa
IE
f D f) plus expected revenue 
earned through the penalty (Ff), which gives  
(20) 
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The components of this expression are given in Table A1.   
Comparison and summary of cases (a) through (f) 
Cases (a) through (f) characterize all of the sub-game perfect, short run equilibrium 
outcomes attainable in the strategic game that was represented in Figure 1.  In each case, 
the monopolist’s optimal choice of price and quantity for the licensed GM seed variety, 
given any corrective tax or subsidy in place, allows a determination of the quantities of 
each crop variety that are grown by heterogeneous producers.  Knowledge of the cost of 
the externality and of the government’s enforcement activities allows a description of the 
level of social welfare that is achieved by domestic residents from activities in this sector 
of the agricultural economy.   
Table A1 in the Appendix provide the analytical expressions for the principal 
components of domestic social welfare in each case.  These tabulated results reflect the 
role of key assumptions requiring that no single crop variety is allowed to dominate the 
  22seed market for this crop, and that under imperfect enforcement, there is always some 
positive amount of infringement of IPRs.   
The graphical analysis and the tabulated expressions show that a number of 
results established by Giannakas in a similar model also hold in this case.  Specifically, 
(i) producers will produce the GM crop with illegally used seed when the price of GM 
seed is greater than the expected penalty from cheating; (ii) IPR infringement reduces the 
price of the new technology and the quantity supplied by the innovator;  (iii) for a given 
tax regime, IPR infringement increases the adoption of the new technology by producers; 
(iv) imperfect IPR enforcement reduces the rents accruing to the innovator; and (v) IPR 
infringement increases the welfare of all domestic producers that use the GM variety.   
Working from this common analytical base, the present paper adds the following 
results:  The socially optimal corrective tax on legal GM seeds or corrective subsidy on 
traditional seeds reduces total production of the GM crop, with or without full 
enforcement.  With perfect enforcement, the corrective tax and the corrective subsidy are 
equally effective policy instruments and both reach the same equilibrium level of social 
welfare.  With imperfect enforcement, the optimal corrective tax (case (e)) increases the 
portion of the GM crop that is produced with illegal seed, relative to the no-tax case (d).  
Provided that the monopolist faces a linear demand curve and constant short run marginal 
costs, the static incidence of the optimal corrective tax is shared equally (on a per unit 
basis) by the foreign monopolist and the domestic seed purchasers.  [The creation of the 
corrective tax may cause the foreign monopolist to lose more surplus than is indicated by 
tax payments alone, since the monopolist’s quantity supplied also falls.]  For a given tax 
  23or subsidy regime, the negative externalities that accompany the use of the GM seed 
variety are higher in magnitude under imperfect enforcement of the IPRs than under 
perfect enforcement of IPRs.  [This follows directly from Giannakas’s result (iii) in 
previous paragraph].   
Numerical Illustration 
In order to illustrate the analytical results obtained above, Table 1 uses a set of 
hypothetical parameter values that describe the exogenous features of producers’ and 
monopolist’s costs and returns in this economy.  From these parameter values, and from 
the analytical expressions tabulated in the Appendix, one can evaluate numerically the 
expressions for social welfare and each of its components.  
Giannakas previously showed that, in this type of economy, imperfect 
enforcement of IPRs raises domestic welfare, in part because it increases domestic use of 
a beneficial GM variety, and in part because it appropriates for domestic benefit some 
monopoly rents that would have been expatriated.  What this paper shows is that where 
there is a negative externality (with a constant marginal damage function) those general 
results still hold.  Moreover, the introduction of an optimal corrective tax or subsidy to 
address the externality is capable of raising domestic welfare even further.  One of the 
effects of the tax or the subsidy is to reduce the level of the activity that generates the 
negative externality.  As well, the tax alone is relatively effective at appropriating for 
domestic use additional monopoly rents that would have been expatriated.   
  24  Table 1. Numerical Illustration of Cases (a) through (f)  
    Case (a)  Case (b)  Case (c)  Case (d)  Case (e)  Case (f) 
Price of GM seed 
faced by domestic 
producers
a ($/ton) 
2375            3240 1510 1649 2471 1321
Quantity of legal GM 
seed  (tons)  0.69  0.37  0.37  0.65   0.18   0.46 
Quantity of illegal GM 
seed  (tons)  NA
b            NA NA 0.31 0.46 0.25
Tax or subsidy rate per 
unit  ($/ton)  NA            1730 1730 NA 1645 995
Producers’  surplus ($)                 6901 6439 8169 7764 7423 8106
Externality ($)                   -500 -269 -269 -693 -474 -515
Enforcement  cost ($)                 NA NA NA -900 -900 -900
Expected penalty  ($)  NA  NA  NA  261  587  167 
Tax revenue or 
subsidy payment  ($)  NA            647 -1083 NA 302 -283
Innovator’s rent  ($)  [1302]  [378]          [378] [742] [59] [588]
Social welfare
c                  ($) 6401 6817 6817 6432 6938 6575
                                                 
a Numerical illustration is based on the following parameter values: 
s , / 500 $ , / 6300 $ , / 9000 $ , / 6000 $ , / 5250 $ , / 7000 $ ton m ton ton ton p ton p ton p gm t t = = = = = = φ γ 1 = δ  (under perfect 
enforcement),  4 . 0 0 = = δ δ (under imperfect enforcement),  ton / 13000 $ = ρ ,  500 $ = α ,  700 $ = β ,  ton c / 720 $ = . 
b NA: Not applicable 
c Social welfare is the sum of all rows from producers’ surplus down, except for innovator’s rent 
  25  Whereas the tax and subsidy are equally effective ways to increase social welfare 
in the case of perfect enforcement, it is clear that their distributional effects within the 
domestic economy differ considerably.  In the case of imperfect enforcement, taxes are a 
relatively more effective policy instrument to address the presence of the externality.  The 
optimal tax rate is relatively large and has a significant effect on social welfare, whereas 
the optimal rate of subsidy is relatively low, and the subsidy has an insignificant effect on 
social welfare. 
Conclusion 
Previous analysis of public policy toward biotechnology has focused on important 
questions such as whether to grant and whether to enforce intellectual property rights on 
GM varieties.  Separate analysis has looked at the type and degree of harm that might 
accompany such technologies, such as when the GM variety generates a negative 
externality.  The present paper integrates aspects of both issues, and does so in an 
analytical framework complete with the exercise of (foreign) market power and with 
heterogeneous (domestic) producers with diverse valuations of the new technology.  The 
results of this analysis support the implementation of public policy in a strategic manner 
that must incorporate the optimizing behavior of all other agents.  Whereas the use of a 
corrective tax provides a relatively more effective instrument than a corrective subsidy, 
there may be considerable scope to consider other incentives and instruments singly or 
jointly with those employed here. 
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Components  (a): No infringement of IPRs, 
no corrective tax to 
address the externality 
(b): No infringement of IPRs, 
new corrective tax to 
address the externality 
(c): No Infringement of IPRs, new 
corrective subsidy to address the 
externality 
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1 Whereas Giannakas explores the implications of an endogenous enforcement policy 
under that the assumption that biotechnology conveys no externalities, the current article 
introduces such externalities and treats the enforcement regimes as exogenous, so as to 
focus on the effects of a corrective tax or subsidy as a policy instrument. 
2 Giannakas invokes the further assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the levels of seed use and the supply of crop output for all producers.  That 
assumption is relaxed here, so that the GM variety might result in yield or productivity 
differences that vary across producers.   
3 Figures (2) and (3) and this solution of the monopolist’s problem are due to Giannakas.  
The analysis and results of cases (a) and (d) are analogous to those in Giannakas except 
for noted differences such as the introduction here of externalities that will lower social 
welfare.  All other cases find no counterpart in Giannakas, since they introduce a 
corrective tax or subsidy to address the new externality and since (in (d), (e) and (f)) the 
level of enforcement is exogenous. 
4 In this example, the external effect is a social cost, and the term   detracts from 
social welfare, W .  In an example where the GM variety brought a productivity gain to 
some producers and a positive external benefit to other residents, the value of that benefit 
would be – .  In such a case, any corrective tax on GM seed would become a 
corrective subsidy, and any corrective subsidy on the traditional seed would become a 
corrective tax. 
  30  31
                                                                                                                                                 
5 A subsidy might alternatively be offered in the market for GM seed, such as by 
providing a per unit subsidy to producers for each unit reduction in use of GM seed as 
measured from some historical benchmark, if one exists.  The effects of a subsidy in that 
market are expected to parallel quite closely the effects of the corrective tax in case (b), 
and are not modeled formally here.   